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With the increase in reports of priest pedophilia over the last dec-
ade,' a corresponding number of civil cases have been brought against
the Catholic Church. Moreover, the recent trend for courts and legisla-
tures to promote more permissive statute of limitations policies in cases
of past sexual abuse has greatly expanded the Church's potential
liability.
2
* The author is a partner in the El Paso law firm of Ainsa, Skipworth, Conde and Marti-
nez, where he represents the Diocese of El Paso. Mr. Ainsa received his undergraduate
degree from Spring Hill College and his law degree from the University of Texas. He is
admitted to practice in Texas before the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Mr. Ainsa is a
member of the El Paso Bar Association, the State Bar of Texas, and in 1992 was elected to
the Texas Bar Foundation.
I Since 1984, over 400 Catholic priests in North America have been accused of molesting
children. See Elizabeth Fernandez et. al., Cop Report Says Priest Molested Altar Boys, S.F.
ExAmFa;, Aug. 21, 1994, at A-1. The Church estimates that 2% of all priests are poten-
tially abusive. See Donn Esmonde, Light Must Be Shed to Let Sex-Abuse Victims Be Saved,
BuFF. NEws, Dec. 23, 1993; see also Jill Fedje, Note, Liability for Sexual Abuse: The Anom-
alous Immunity of Churches, 9 LAw & MQ. J. 133, 134 (1990) (reporting that approxi-
mately 5% of American priests are engaged in misconduct involving children).
2 The Catholic Church has paid approximately $400 million in legal and medical costs. See
Fernandez, supra note 1, at A-i; Barbara L. Fredricksen, Author Documents Ugly Truth
About Pedophilia and the Priesthood, ST. PETERSBuRG Tm&Es, Nov. 22, 1992, at 6D; see also
Jason Berry, Church Leaders Hide Their Sick Priests, IRisH Tmms, Oct. 15, 1994, at 7 (pro-
viding more recent estimate of $500 million in legal and medical costs due to child abuse by
clergy); Carl Herko, How the Catholic Church Ducks the Issue of Sex Abuse, BUFF. NEws,
Mar. 28, 1993, at 7 (describing that $400 million already expended by Catholic Church for
misconduct liability represented nearly six times Vatican deficit). It is projected that the
Church may face as much as $1 billion in short-term, future losses. See Fernandez, supra
note 1, at A-i; Jason Berry, Fathers and Sins, L.A. TudEs, June 13, 1993, at 24 (citing 1985
internal Church document projecting $1 billion in future losses); Patricia Edmonds, Priests'
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The statute of limitations3 is often the only' defense a diocese will
have when confronted with a child molestation lawsuit involving a mem-
ber of the clergy. In some states, such as New York,4 California, 5 and
Minnesota,6 legislatures have tolled the statute of limitations in certain
situations where the cause of action is brought many years after the of-
fense allegedly occurrs.7 However, in other states, like Texas and New
Mexico, it is still an open issue that has yet to be decided by the states'
highest courts. Ironically, these two states are the sources of some of the
most potent litigation at this time.
8
I. PROBLEMATIC STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SITUATIONS
Generally, there are two situations where the practitioner will be
confronted with a statute of limitations issue. The first situation in-
volves a plaintiff who was allegely molested many years ago-most often
more than twenty-but who does not allege that he or she suffered from
any mental disability at the time that the alleged molestation occurred.
The plaintiff further alleges that, due to the trauma surrounding the
event, he or she completely suppressed the memory of the event and only
Path to Redemption After Sex Abuse, USA TODAY, July 30, 1993, at 6A (reporting projection
that Church could spend $1 billion on pedophilia issue before end of century).
3 The rationale for the statute of limitations is threefold. First, in the interest of fairness,
defendants must be put on timely notice of a claim against them so that they may preserve
the availability of evidence and witnesses, and defend while witness' recollections are still
fresh. See Gary Hood, The Statute of Limitations Barrier in Civil Suits Brought by Adult
Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse: A Simple Solution, 1994 U. IL.. L. REV. 417, 424 n.77
(1994). Secondly, a potential defendant should remain free of the perpetual fear of having
an action brought for some alleged past grievance. See id. at 424 n.78. He or she should be
provided with a sense of repose after the passage of a predetermined amount of time. Fi-
nally, the justice system does not want to encourage plaintiffs to sleep on their rights. See
id. at 425 n.80. However, most courts and legislatures allow tolling in certain cases involv-
ing minors, fraudulent concealment, insanity, or equitable estoppel. See, e.g., CAL. CrV.
PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West Supp. 1993) (minors, fraud); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 208 (Con-
sol. 1990) (minors, insanity); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 555 (1993) (fraudulent concealment).
4 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 208 (Consol. 1990).
5 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West Supp. 1993).
6 MiN?. STAT. ANN. § 541.073 (West Supp. 1993).
7 For a discussion on legislative responses to the problem, see Hood, supra note 3, at 435-
36.
8 See, e.g., Vesecky v. Vesecky, 880 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Ct. App., 5th Dist.) (applying discov-
ery rule in child sex abuse case where psychological defense mechanisms prevented discov-
ery of abuse, writ granted, 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 120 (1994); Sanchez v. Archdiocese of San
Antonio, 873 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Ct. App., 4th Dist. 1994) (holding that discovery rule did not
apply to incident where plaintiff alleged sexual abuse by nun forty-five years prior to filing
suit); Martinez-Sandoval v. Kirsch, 884 P.2d 507 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (declining applica-
tion of discovery rule where sexual abuse alleged resulted in pregnancy and venerial dis-
ease), cert. denied, 885 P.2d 1325 (N.M. 1994).
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recollected it years later, after receiving psychotherapy.9 The complain-
ant then proceeds to file suit within two years after relearning or
reawakening the memory of the event.
In the second situation, a plaintiff alleges very similax facts but ad-
mits in the pleading that there was no suppression of the memory of the
molestation. Rather, he or she denies comprehending the causal connec-
tion between the sexual molestation and the psychological problems dis-
covered years later during psychotherapy.' ° The plaintiff usually files
suit within two years of learning of the causal connection between the
alleged molestation and the psychological problems. These two fact pat-
terns are recurrent themes in molestation cases.
II. COMMENCEMENT OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A Legal Injury vs. Discovery Rules
Under the traditional tort doctrine of most states, the "legal injury
rule" governs the commencement of the running of the statute of limita-
tions intort cases." The legal injury rule states that the statute of limi-
tations begins to run at the time that the legal injury actually occurs.1 2
However, in an effort to ameliorate the injustice that can occur
through a strict application of the legal injury rule in child molestation
cases, some courts have applied a "discovery" rule: Essentially, the dis-
covery rule operates to delay the commencement of the statute of limita-
tions until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence could have discovered, the existence of the injury or the causal
connection between the injury and the plaintiff's physical or psychologi-
cal injury. 13
B. Application of the Discovery Rule in Sexual Abuse Cases
While certain legal issues are recurrent in these cases, it is difficult
to generalize in this area because each situation requires a state-by-
states analysis. In Tyson v. Tyson,'14 a case involving child molestation
in a memory-suppression situation,1 5 the Washington Supreme Court re-
9 See Hood, supra note 3, at 428-29 (discussing memory suppression situation); Tina Snell-
ing & Wayne Fisher, Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse: Should Texas Courts
Apply the Discovery Rule?, 33 S. Tax. L. Rxv. 377, 384 (1992).
10 See Snelling & Fisher, supra note 9, at 384.
11 See 1 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AmERiCAN LAW OF ToRTs § 5:27, at 880 (1983).
12 See id.; Snelling & Fisher, supra note 9, at 402.
13 See generally Snelling & Fisher, supra note 9, at 391-94 (reviewing application of discov-
ery rule in sex abuse cases).
14 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986).
15 Id. at 227. The plaintiff alleged that she was sexually molested as a child by her father.
Id.
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fused to apply the discovery rule.16 The court was concerned that the
discovery rule permitted the plaintiff to select a time to recall the
event, 7 and relied too extensively on psychiatric and psychological testi-
mony. ' The Washington Supreme Court was not convinced that psychi-
atric and psychological medicine had advanced to the point where reli-
ance on this testimony provided sufficient empirical proof on which to
base a cause of action. 19
The majority opinion in Tyson was met with a vehement dissent,20
and ultimately led the Washington state legislature to enact a special
limitations statute to govern molestation cases.2 ' A similar trend ap-
pears to be taking hold nationally. Due to the factual nature of the cases
and the extreme public outcry that often accompanies them, courts and
legislatures are increasingly inclined to either create a judicial discovery
rule or enact a similar statutory solution.
22
Another case that addressed the statute of limitations problem in
molestation cases is Messina v. Bonner.23 In Messina, two girls sued
their stepfather and natural mother for alleged sexual abuse that had
occurred some eighteen years earlier.24 Both girls admitted that they
had known that the abuse had occurred,2 5 but had failed to make a com-
plete causal connection between the abuse and their psychological
problems.2 6
The Pennsylvania District Court held that previous Pennsylvania
case law would have justified granting the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment. 2 7 It noted, however, that when a causal connection ar-
gument is made by a plaintiff in an attempt to toll the statute of limita-
tions, psychiatric medicine is not precise enough to establish a beginning
and end to all psychiatric problems.2 8 Accordingly, if the discovery rule
were to be applied, the possibility would exist that, for some plaintiffs,
16 Id. at 228-30.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 227.
19 Tyson, 727 P.2d at 228-30.
20 Id. at 230 (Pearson, J. dissenting) (stating that majority does not properly consider enor-
mity of problem of childhood sexual abuse).
21 WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.340 (1989).
22 See supra notes 4-6 & 8 and accompanying text (discussing judicial and legislative rem-
edies to statute of limitations).
23 813 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
24 Id at 347.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 348.
27 Baily v. Lewis, 763 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Pa.) (holding that discovery rule did not apply to
memory-suppression situation), aff'd, 950 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1991).
28 Messina, 813 F. Supp. at 349-50.
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the statute of limitations might never commence.29 Under a causal-con-
nection pretext, complainants might be able to contend that they have
never fully appreciated the causal connection between the alleged moles-
tation and their current psychological difficulties. 30 The district court
applied this rationale in refusing to apply the discovery rule.31
Tyson and Messina reflect that some courts are not convinced that
psychological and psychiatric testimony is a sufficient basis on which to
impose the discovery rule. Yet, numerous cases from other jurisdictions
reveal that some courts are willing to allow such testimony as a basis for
employing the discovery rule.32
III. DIOCESE OF EL PASO
While there are several appellate court decisions in Texas involving
the application of the discovery rule to child molestation cases,33 the
Texas Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the issue. The discovery
rule has been applied, however, in other contexts.34 In 1988, the Texas
Supreme Court applied the rule to cases of legal malpractice because it
concluded that, in many cases, it would be difficult for most plaintiffs to
discover the legal malpractice until years after it had taken place. 35
Texas courts have also applied the discovery rule in fraud cases3 6
under a three-prong analysis.3 7 A court must examine: "(1) the nature of
the plaintiff's case, and the type of evidence required to establish and
29 Id. at 350.
30 Id
31 Id at 349.
32 See, e.g., Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1348-49 (Utah 1993) (holding affidavit submit-
ted by expert witness regarding victim's repressed memories sufficiently supported applica-
tion of discovery rule); Evans v. Eckelman, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605, 609 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(disagreeing with Tyson's argument that lack of verifiable evidence and reliance on memo-
ries and expert testimony would increase "spurious" litigation); Ault v. Jasko, 637 N.E.2d
870, 872 (Ohio 1994) (applying discovery rule despite contention of unfairness due to rule's
reliance on expert testimony to prove fault and damages); Lovelace v. Keohane, 831 P.2d
624, 631 (Okla. 1992) (stating that expert psychiatric testimony can aid in determination of
whether discovery rule applies).
33 See supra note 8 (citing relevant decisions by Texas Court of Appeals).
34 See, e.g., Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1988) (legal malpractice); Kelley v.
Rinkle, 532 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. 1976) (false credit report); Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.
1972) (negligent vasectomy operation); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967) (for-
eign object medical malpractice); Quinn v. Press, 140 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1940) (fraud). But
see Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1977) (stating that discovery rule does not
apply to medical misdiagnosis case).
35 Willis, 736 S.W.2d at 646.
36 Quinn, 140 S.W.2d at 438.
37 Precision Sheet Metal Mfg. Co. v. Yates, 794 S.W.2d 545, 549-50 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990)
(interpreting Southwest Bank & Trust Co. v. Bankers Commer. Life Ins. Co., 563 S.W.2d
329, 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)).
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defend the claim; (2) the length of the limitations period in question, and
the wrongful act's susceptibility to discovery within that period; and (3)
the susceptibility of cases to fraudulent prosecution if [the] limitation is
tolled."3"
The cases involving the Diocese of El Paso are instructive on how the
discovery rule has the potential to be abused in sexual molestation cases
in which the statute of limitations has otherwise expired. During the
early 1970s, Father Holley was a priest in the Diocese of Worcester, Mas-
sachusetts. He was a known pedophile who was sent by the Diocese of
Worcester to the Order of the Paraclete Treatment Center in Jemez
Springs, New Mexico39 to be treated for pedophilia.40 At this time, there
were varying opinions concerning the state of the art of knowledge of
pedophilia. At the rehabilitation center, Father Holley received spiritual
and medical treatment.
He was subsequently sent out, without warning, to do "weekend
work" at various parishes surrounding Albuquerque, New Mexico, which
were, at that time, part of the Diocese of El Paso.4 1 During the time he
was involved in this work, a number of molestation incidents occurred.42
Eight allegations of molestation were subsequently filed against the Dio-
cese of El Paso.4" The Diocese ultimately reassigned him to other work.
When all of the incidents became public, Father Holley was charged with
a criminal offense and returned to New Mexico, where he pled guilty and
was sentenced to a maximum of 275 years in New Mexico state prison.4 4
The plaintiffs' New Mexico attorney45 pled these cases to allege that
all eight plaintiffs had suppressed the memory of being molested, and all
eight had remembered the sexual abuse at the same time. Clearly, these
cases involve some very tragic and unpleasant facts. However, the prob-
lem that faces the Diocese of El Paso, and others across the country, is
that, today, plaintiffs' attorneys are virtually turning the phrase "sup-
pression of the memory of the event" into magic words. These lawyers
condition and school their plaintiffs to parrot these words during deposi-
tions. They utilize psychiatric and psychological testimony in such a way
that the complaints cannot be dismissed through a summary judgment
38 Id at 550.
39 Stephen Kurklian, Priest Accused of Abuse While at Parish in Mass.: Sexual Misconduct
Allegations Widen, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 21, 1992, at 1.
40 Stephen Kurkian, New Mexico Lawyer Alleges Boys Abused by Worcester Priest, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 16, 1992, at 42.
41 Priests and Abuse, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 16, 1993, at 42.
42 Id.
43 Benjamin Keck, 8 Men Filing Lawsuit Accusing Priest of Molestation, EL PASO ThMES,
Dec. 29, 1992.
44 Ex-priest Sentenced for Molesting Boys, Cm. TRm., June 5, 1993, at 6.
45 Keck, supra note 43.
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motion, since this method of pleading complaints almost always raises
substantive issues of fact. If the discovery rule is applied to these cases,
there is virtually no way to avoid a trial.
CONCLUSION
Where defendants are faced with going to trial in these cases, the
facts are usually so egregious that it is not difficult to presume where the
jury will side. Because, in many instances, the molestation is admitted,
'if defendants do not prevail at the summary judgment phase, the issue
will be whether the diocese is liable or whether the limitations defense is
available. Due, in part, to the widespread publicity these cases receive,
fraudulent causes of action are being perpetrated. Plaintiffs' attorneys
are simply creating fact situations which, in my opinion, do not exist.
Unfortunately, the current legal abuses in molestation cases exemplify
the remark of a prominent plaintiff's lawyer in El Paso: "When you can't
amend the law, amend the facts."

